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tiff and defendant have common purchasers and a common market is a persuasive factor.14 In the present case the plaintiff's
prescription bottles are sold wholesale to the druggist trade and
reach the consumer only as an anonymous container of the drug
he has asked for, whereas the defendant's nursing bottles are
retailed directly to parents. Likewise, if the two kinds of goods
are used for wholly different purposes, there is a lesser degree
of likelihood that they will be associated with a single source. 5
In the present case the court emphasized the heat-resisting qualities of the defendant's products, a feature which adapted them
to special uses for which ordinary glass, such as that manufactured by the plaintiff, is unfit.
The court's conclusion appears to be sound, although the
language employed is not as clear and precise as might be desired.
J.T.B.

TRUSTS-ACT 107 OF 1920-VALIDITY OF PREMATURE TERMINATION-A testarix created a short term trust under the provisions of Act 107 of 1920.1 Upon the insistence of the plaintiff, a
beneficiary who had attained the age of majority and was of
full legal capacity, the trustee and the other beneficiaries consented to a termination of the trust several years prior to the
date provided in the will. The principal was distributed among
the beneficiaries. After squandering his portion, the plaintiff
brought this action to have the trust estate reconstituted and the
agreement declared void. Held, that the 1920 act did not prohibit the termination of trusts by agreement between the beneficiary and the trustee, and that the plaintiff was estopped from
annuling the settlement with his trustee, since he was unable
to return the trust property. Hagerty v. Clement, 195 La. 230,
196 So. 330 (1940).
14. See Akron-Overland Tire Co. v. Willys-Overland Co., 273 Fed. 674
(C.C.A. 3rd, 1921); Hudson Motor Car Co. v. Hudson Tire Co., 21 F. (2d) 453
(D.C.N.J. 1927); Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Standard Surety & Casualty Co.,
53 F.

(2d) 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).

15. Most of the cases illustrating this position deal with complimentary
articles. See Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 Fed. 407 (C.C.A.
2d, 1917) ("Aunt Jemima" for pancake flour and syrup); Akron-Overland Tire
Co. v. Willys-Overland Co., 273 Fed. 674 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1921)

("Overland" for

automobiles and tires); American Tobacco Co. v. Gordon, 10 F. (2d) 646 (App.
D.C. 1925)

("Pall Mall" for cigarettes and cigarette holders).

1. La. Act. 107 of 1920, repealed by La. Act 7 of 1935 (3 E. S.) [Dart's
Stats. (1939)

§ § 9815-9822].
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The Trust Estates Act of 1938,2 based in great part on AngloAmerican trust law,8 settles the question of trust termination

with regard to a private trust created after the effective date of
the statute. The act provides that the trust shall not be terminated even though the settlor, the trustee, and the beneficiary all
consent thereto.4 Exceptions are made where the accomplishment
of the purpose of the trust becomes impossible or illegal, 5 or
where circumstances not known to the settlor and not anticipated
by him substantially impair the accomplishment of the purpose,'
or when the settlor reserves the power to revoke. 7
Although this problem has been provided for under the
new act, the instant case is still of importance to trustees, beneficiaries and donors of trusts created under Act 107 of 1920.
The court might have adopted the position that the attempted
dissolution of the agreement and the disposal of the trust assets
amounted to a breach of trust by the trustee. However, the beneficiary could not recover in view of the well settled common law
rule that a beneficiary who has consented to a breach of trust
cannot hold the trustee liable therefor, especially when he receives the resulting benefits. 8 Under this view the conclusion
reached in the instant case is amply supported by general trust
law. But, the Louisiana court was not content to rest on this
doctrine, and proceeded to declare the agreement valid and the
trust terminated. This is unfortunate, not only because of the
2. La. Act 81 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § § 9850.1-9850.1011.
3. The act was formulated mainly upon the common law ideas crystallized
in the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of Trusts. Resort
was also made to the Uniform Trusts Act, the Uniform Principal and Income
Act, and the proposed Uniform Spendthrift Trusts Act in order to provide Louisiana with a comprehensive and up-to-date trust statute. For a
history and background of the act, see Wallace, The Trust Estates Act
Handbook (1938) vi-x. For general discussions on this legislation, see Hebert
and Lazarus, The Louisiana Legislation of 1938 (1938) 1 LOuISIANA LAW REVIEw 80, 137; Nabors, Proposals for Amendment of the Louisiana Trust Act
and the Louisiana Life Insurance Exemption Statute (1934) 8 Tulane L.
Rev. 522; Nabors, The Shortcomings of the Louisiana Trust Estates Act
and Some Problems of Drafting Trust Instruments Thereunder (1939) 13
Tulane L. Rev. 178; Stubbs, Louisiana Trusts for the Louisiana Lawyer
(1939) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 774; Wisdom, A Trust Code in the Civil Law,
Based on the Restatement and Uniform Acts: The Louisiana Trust Estates
Act (1938) 13 Tulane L. Rev. 70; Wisdom, Progress in the Codification of
Trusts (1940) 14 Tulane L. Rev. 165.
4. La. Act 81 of 1938, § 92 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 9850.92].
5. Id. at § 90 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 9850.90].
6. Id. at § 91 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 9850.911.
7. Id. at § § 87-89 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § § 9850.87-9850.89].
8. Lemen v. McComas and Downey, 63 Md. 153 (1884); Partridge v.
Clary, 228 Mass. 290, 117 N.E. 332 (1917); Butterfleld v. Cowing, 112 N.Y.
486, 20 N.E. 369 (1889); Vohmann v. Michel, 185 N.Y. 420, 78 N.E. 156 (1906).
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common law decisions," but also because of the peculiar circumstances surrounding the Louisiana act.
Since this act was an exception to the codal prohibition of
trusts, 10 the trustees and beneficiaries thereunder possess only
those powers expressly bestowed or necessarily implied by it.1'
It grants no powers of termination to either trustee or beneficiary or to both. On the other hand it makes no attempt to
define or limit the authority or duties of the trustee, the beneficiary, or the donor, other than to require the trustee to administer the property in conformity with the directions contained in the act of donation. 12 By the general rules of statutory
interpretation, affirmative provisions of this kind imply a negation of any authority not comprehended within the statute. 18
In the case under discussion the testatrix specified that the
property bequeathed to the plaintiff was to be delivered to him
by the trustee "upon the expiration of ten years from his reaching the age of majority.' 1

4

This provision of the act of donation

should be binding on both the trustee and the beneficiaries, under
the 1920 act. 15
H. H. P.
9. Shelton v. King, 229 U.S. 90, 33 S. Ct. 686, 57 L. Ed. 1086 (1913); Blackburn v. Blackburn, 167 Ky. 113, 180 S.W. 48 (1915); Claflin v. Claflin, 149
Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454 (1889); Butterfield v. Cowing, 112 N.Y. 486, 20 N.E.
369 (1889); Vohmann v. Michel, 185 N.Y. 420, 78 N.E. 156 (1906); Estate of
Moses Stambaugh, in Trust, 135 Pa. 585, 19 Atl. 1058 (1890); Simonin's Estate, 260 Pa. 395, 103 Atl. 927 (1918).
10. Art. 1520, La. Civil Code of 1870.
11. ". . . privileges are the creatures of the law, and the law creating
them is to be strictly construed as granting to particular persons advantages
not enjoyed by the people generally of common right." Hibernia Bank &
Trust Co. v. C. F. Knoll Planting & Mfg. Co., 133 La. 697, 708, 63 So. 288,
292 (1913).
But a statutory grant of an express power carries with it by necessary
implication every other power necessary and proper to the execution of the
power expressly granted. Boos v. McClendon, 130 La. 813, 58 So. 582 (1912).
12. La. Act 107 of 1920, § 4.
13. Expressio unius est excZusio alterius.
14. The donor has the right to prescribe the period of duration provided, however, that the period "shall not exceed ten years after the death
of the donor, except when the beneficiary is a minor at the time of the.
death of the donor, in which case it shall not exceed ten years after the
minor has attained majority ..... " La. Act 107 of 1920, § 2.
15. La. Act 77 of 1935 (3 E. S.) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § § 9815-9822],
Which repealed La. Act 107 of 1920, was declared to be unconstitutional
insofar as it applied to trusts already in existence. It was held that a
trustee under the 1920 act was vested with substantial rights which could
not be divested by the repeal of the law authorizing the creation of trusts.
Succession of Manning, 185 La. 894, 171 So. 68 (1936); Succession of Forstner,
186 La. 577, 173 So. 111 (1937). Since the trustee's rights, derived from declarations of the donor, were upheld, uniformity of jurisprudence favors respect for the donors' intentions in regard to the duration and termination
of the trust.

